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A U.S. Treaty Ally Should Keep Its Word: Washington Should Urge Thailand to Implement Its Agreements with Cambodia
By Noranarith Anandayath
October 24, 2026
In October 2025, the prime ministers of Cambodia and Thailand signed a Joint Declaration in Kuala Lumpur that was witnessed by President Donald Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The document reaffirmed an earlier ceasefire, committed both sides to the withdrawal of heavy weapons under ASEAN observation, joint humanitarian demining, the release of prisoners, and steps to restore normal relations. It was not a final border settlement, but it was a concrete set of mutual obligations designed to stop the cycle of clashes that had already killed people and displaced hundreds of thousands.
One year later, key parts of that declaration and the follow-on ceasefire statement of 27 December 2025 remain only partially implemented. Cambodia has repeatedly called for the resumption of the Joint Boundary Commission to survey and demarcate the land border, citing the Kuala Lumpur commitments. It has also raised concerns about continued Thai military presence and fortifications in areas it regards as its territory. Thailand, for its part, has linked further progress on land talks to security conditions involving landmines and transnational crime, unilaterally terminated the long-standing 2001 memorandum on maritime overlapping claims, and has at times described the door to bilateral land negotiations as effectively closed while the maritime dispute moves through UNCLOS conciliation. Both governments accuse the other of incomplete compliance. The result is a fragile pause rather than the durable de-escalation the 2025 documents promised.
This situation matters to the United States because Thailand is a treaty ally. The 1954 Manila Pact and the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué established mutual defense understandings that remain in force. In 2003 Washington designated Thailand a major non-NATO ally. The two countries conduct large-scale exercises such as Cobra Gold and maintain extensive military and intelligence cooperation. An ally relationship is not a blank check, but it does create a legitimate channel for private and public encouragement when an ally’s actions affect regional stability and the credibility of agreements in which the United States itself invested diplomatic capital.
The United States has already used that channel. During earlier rounds of fighting, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others called on both sides to honor ceasefires and de-escalate. In 2025 the administration linked progress on tariff negotiations to a halt in hostilities, helping produce the July ceasefire that preceded the Kuala Lumpur declaration. Cambodia has since asked Washington to help facilitate the resumption of Joint Boundary Commission work. Continued quiet or public urging that Thailand implement the specific steps it signed—withdrawal verification, demining coordination, restoration of higher-level diplomatic representation, and a return to technical border talks—is consistent with previous U.S. practice and with the interests of a stable mainland Southeast Asia.
Critics will note that Cambodia also has obligations and that mutual distrust is deep. That is correct. Any U.S. message should be paired with expectations that Phnom Penh likewise fulfill its commitments and refrain from actions that undermine confidence. The UNCLOS conciliation process now under way on the maritime boundary offers a parallel track that both sides have accepted in principle; supporting its work does not require Washington to take sides on the underlying claims. The point is narrower: when a U.S. treaty ally signs a high-profile, U.S.-witnessed set of de-escalation measures and then conditions or delays their implementation, American policymakers have both the standing and the interest to ask for fuller compliance.
Doing so serves several practical purposes. It reduces the risk of renewed fighting that would again displace civilians and draw in outside powers. It reinforces the norm that agreements signed in the presence of the United States are meant to be carried out. And it demonstrates that the alliance with Thailand is a two-way relationship capable of addressing difficult issues rather than a relationship of automatic deference. Thailand’s own long-term interests are also served by a predictable, demarcated border and reduced military tension with its neighbor; domestic political incentives have at times pointed in the opposite direction.
Washington does not need to redesign its broader Asia strategy or choose between Thailand and Cambodia. It needs only to use the leverage and access it already possesses to encourage its treaty ally to finish the work it publicly agreed to do in Kuala Lumpur and in the December 2025 joint statement. A clear, consistent message—delivered privately at senior levels and, if necessary, reinforced publicly—would be a modest but useful contribution to preventing the next round of clashes along a border that has already seen too many.
#Cambodia #thailand #PrakSokhonn #DonaldTrump #AnwarIbrahim #Anutin #MarcoRubio #kualalumpurpeaceaccords #borderdemarcation
