Clarification of the spokesperson of the delegation of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the 151st Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly has observed with considerable dismay that, on 23 October 2025, the Nation media has been shamelessly spreading false information and distorting the truth.

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Clarification of the spokesperson of the delegation of the Kingdom of Cambodia

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 The statement of the outcome of the GBC meeting in Malaysia is to withdraw heavy weapons, clear anti-personnel mines, crack down on online gambling, and define the role of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) in order to restore the situation to its original state in Cambodian-Thai relations.Joint Press Statement
2nd Special General Border Committee (GBC) Meeting Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
23 October 2025
The 2nd Special Thailand-Cambodia General Border Committee (GBC) Meeting was held on 23 October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was co-chaired by H.E. General Nattaphon Narkphanit, Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand, and H.E. General Tea Seiha, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence of the Kingdom of Cambodia. The Meeting was observed by the representatives from Malaysia, the United States, and members of the Interim Observer Teams in Cambodia and Thailand.
The Meeting was convened as a follow-up to the 1st Special GBC Meeting, held on 10 September 2025 in Koh Kong Province, Kingdom of Cambodia, to finalize concrete action plans for the full and effective implementation of its outcomes.
Both sides expressed sincere appreciation to the Government and the Ministry of Defence of Malaysia for hosting the Special Meeting, including the preparatory meeting of its secretariats, from 20 to 22 October 2025.
Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful resolution of differences and to strengthening good-neighbourly relations in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the ASEAN Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes, paving the way for a new chapter of peace and cooperation between the two nations.
In this spirit, both sides agreed as follows:
A. The Meeting agreed on and endorsed the Action Plan for Removal of Heavy and Destructive Weapons.
B. Both sides welcomed the agreed Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Establishment of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT)
C. Both sides welcomed the agreed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the Joint Coordinating Task Force (JCTF) on Humanitarian Demining.
D. Both sides agreed to meet up within one week after this GBC Meeting to identify a pilot border area for humanitarian demining within the priority border areas to be agreed upon by both sides.
E. Both sides agreed on the Action Plan for Cooperation on the Prevention and Suppression of Transnational Crimes, including Cyber Scams and Human Trafficking, between the Cambodian National Police and the Royal Thai Police. The Action Plan aims to strengthen cooperation in intelligence sharing, operational support for investigations and the apprehension of suspects, crime prevention, and measures concerning suspects, victims, and evidence. In accordance with the action plan, the Joint Task Force on the Implementation of the Action Plan will be established within two weeks.
F. Both sides agreed that the next Special GBC Meeting will be convened within 90 days or as necessary after this meeting, with Cambodia as the hosting state.
Ednu

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The statement of the outcome of the GBC meeting in Malaysia is to withdraw heavy weapons,

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 Razor-Wire at the Border: Thailand’s Design, Cambodia’s Protest

Approximately 9.8 kilometers of razor-wire fencing and tire barricades now cut across the Thai–Cambodian frontier, the most visible symbol of a ceasefire under strain. Since early August 2025, Thai forces have reinforced sectors in Sa Kaeo, Surin, and Si Sa Ket provinces with these barriers. Bangkok frames them as temporary safety measures against unexploded ordnance (UXO). Phnom Penh calls them a violation of the August 7 Extraordinary General Border Committee (GBC) ceasefire agreement. The truth lies in how each side interprets law, risk, and political pressure (Nation Thailand, 13 Aug 2025).

What Bangkok Says

Thai commanders point to the battlefield legacy of July’s clashes. In Surin province, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams documented a sharp rise in UXO hazards, with 824 impact sites identified along the border (PRD Thailand, 13 Aug 2025). In this environment, the Second Army Region argues, crossings cannot reopen until the ground is cleared and verified safe.

The Internal Security Act (2008) empowers the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) to restrict movement in declared security zones. On August 13, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the barriers are “temporary reinforcement measures” that “do not prejudice demarcation talks” (MFA Thailand, 13 Aug 2025). The military adds a second rationale: razor-wire allows “rapid tactical deployment” in case of renewed clashes — a rationale that stretches beyond humanitarian safety.

Notably, the installations accelerated after August 4, when Thai forces first laid wire in An Ses — three days before the GBC ceasefire was signed — suggesting pre-planned fortification rather than purely reactive safety measures (Nation Thailand, 13 Aug 2025).

What Phnom Penh Sees

Cambodian officials present a different picture. On August 13, the Defense Ministry released photographs and statements alleging Thai troops entered Choak Chey village (13.759°N, 102.744°E, Banteay Meanchey) and the An Ses area (13.783°N, 104.967°E, Preah Vihear) to lay razor-wire and tires (Phnom Penh Post, 13 Aug 2025). The Banteay Meanchey provincial administration declared the installations a “unilateral action” inconsistent with the Regional Border Committee (RBC) framework, which requires consultation. Phnom Penh has demanded removal of barriers at multiple locations, including the Ta Moan Thom temple zone (Phnom Penh Post, 13 Aug 2025).

These protests are not only legal but political. Domestically, Hun Manet’s government faces criticism from opposition figures such as Kem Sokha and the Candlelight Party for being too soft on Thailand (Cambodia Daily, 12 Aug 2025). Hardline responses at the border help blunt those attacks, raising the political cost of compromise in Phnom Penh.

The Legal Grey Zone

The legal core of the dispute is procedural. The August 7 GBC communiqué, signed by both nations’ defense ministers, prohibited new troop movements and required both sides to “maintain current status” (ThaiPBS, 8 Aug 2025). Past GBC minutes (November 2024) reaffirmed the principle of “prior notification and mutual consultation for any border activities likely to cause misunderstanding” (Nation Thailand, 23 Nov 2024). Thailand argues that informing Cambodia after installation suffices; Cambodia insists consultation must come first.

Some Thai legal scholars argue Cambodia selectively invokes consultation requirements — Phnom Penh installed its own fortifications near Samrong in late July without RBC notification (Bangkok Post, 10 Aug 2025). However, this does not resolve whether Thailand’s current barriers violate the August 7 ceasefire terms, which reset obligations for both parties.

With GBC-mandated observer teams still not deployed, there is no neutral verification. Each side’s narrative remains self-reinforcing. As former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa observed during the 2011 Preah Vihear crisis: “Border barriers reflect internal politics more than external threats” (ISEAS, 2020).

Stakes on the Ground

The economic stakes are significant. The Bank of Thailand estimated monthly trade losses of 10 billion baht during full closures (Pattaya News, 12 Aug 2025). Export losses could reach 162 billion baht in the second half of 2025 (Nation Thailand, 13 Aug 2025). Meanwhile, displacement has soared: over 138,000 people evacuated in Thailand and more than 300,000 displaced overall along the frontier (Al Jazeera, 5 Aug 2025; Britannica, 2025). These barriers block long-used paths to markets, farms, and family ties, deepening local hardship.

Yet commerce has never outweighed security in Thailand’s border doctrine. In April 2011, four days of fighting near Preah Vihear killed 11 people and forced the reassignment of regional commanders (Reuters, 12 Apr 2011). That memory endures. Today’s generals have little incentive to approve reopening orders that could expose them to similar career-ending risk.

This marks the fourth major cycle of barrier installation since 2008, following deployments in 2008, 2011, and 2019 — each eventually removed through RBC negotiation (ISEAS Working Paper 2020-14). The cycle is familiar: fortify, protest, negotiate, dismantle.

Regional Reverberations

The dispute extends beyond bilateral tensions. ASEAN’s credibility as a conflict-prevention mechanism faces scrutiny, particularly as Myanmar’s crisis strains the bloc’s consensus principle (East Asia Forum, Aug 2025). China watches closely — any Thai-Cambodian escalation could provide Beijing opportunities to position itself as regional stabilizer. Singapore and Indonesia, as ASEAN’s informal leaders, have urged both parties to accept third-party observers (Jakarta Post, 14 Aug 2025). The longer razor-wire remains without neutral verification, the more ASEAN’s relevance in managing member-state disputes comes into question. Early ASEAN-led mediation — especially by Jakarta — could break the impasse.

What to Watch

 1. Observer Deployment – GBC-mandated international observers have yet to arrive; their reports could validate or challenge Cambodia’s claims.

 2. RBC Meetings – Cambodia is expected to push for emergency sessions to register its protests.

 3. UXO Clearance Rates – Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) bulletins are the key technical constraint; rising clearance numbers could enable phased openings.

 4. Commanders’ Rhetoric – Watch Second Army and Burapha Command statements; a shift from “not ready” to “ready if…” often signals reopening within days.

 5. Public Mood in Thailand – A July NIDA poll found over 75% of respondents express high confidence in the armed forces on border issues, versus lower confidence in civilian ministries (Bangkok Post, 30 Jul 2025).

 6. Legal Challenges – Either side could invoke the International Court of Justice’s 1962 Preah Vihear ruling or its 2013 interpretation, which emphasized Thailand’s obligation to withdraw from disputed zones (ICJ, 1962/2013).

Bottom Line

The razor-wire now cutting through Sa Kaeo and Surin is more than an obstacle. To Thailand, it represents a law-bound, conditions-based reopening policy under ISOC authority. To Cambodia, it is a sovereignty breach that violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire. Until neutral observers arrive, the dispute will remain unresolved.

Historical RBC patterns suggest partial reopening at select commercial crossings in the coming months (ISEAS, 2020). Full normalization is unlikely before the November ASEAN Summit in Malaysia. The formula for resolution exists in the 2000 MOU on Border Cooperation: joint verification, graduated reopening, and face-saving exits for both militaries (ThaiPBS, 10 Aug 2025). What’s missing isn’t a mechanism; it’s the political will to use it. Indonesia and Singapore should lead ASEAN efforts to deploy observers and mediate, ensuring the ceasefire holds.

The gates will not reopen until Thai generals, not diplomats, judge the ground safe. In Thailand’s system, that is not dysfunction. It is design.

Methodology: This analysis synthesizes 47 primary sources, including Thai Defense Ministry communiqués, MFA briefings, Nation Thailand, ThaiPBS, Al Jazeera, Cambodian provincial statements, and verified photographic documentation from August 4–16, 2025. All Thai and Khmer materials were cross-checked with independent translations.

Disclosure: I am Arnaud Darc,  Chairman & CEO of Thalias Hospitality Group and Co-Chair of the Government–Private Sector Forum (Working Group D). This article is based on open-source documentation and independent analysis.

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Razor-Wire at the Border: Thailand’s Design, Cambodia’s Protest

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Opinion: Thailand’s misperception of Cambodia

Decades of accusatory anti-government media acting as judges and investigative prosecutors have cemented the narrative of Cambodia as a backward country under a dictatorship, where people lack education and are denied the freedom of expression.

For those who have never been to Cambodia, they cannot let go of such prejudices, shaped by long-term narratives, against Cambodia. But for Cambodian people who live in Cambodia, they have grown tired of reading externally-framed and extremely negative media day-in day-out that has damaged the country’s reputation until today. This has created a persistent misperception of Cambodia among foreigners, including Thais.

1. The thought that “Cambodia is under a dictatorship and its people cannot speak or think differently from the Government”

There is an entrenched misperception among Thais who have never been to Cambodia that Cambodia is under a dictatorship and that the people are blindfolded by the centrally controlled media.

In fact, Cambodians have a wide range of media to choose from. In a country where social media is so prevalent, it is difficult – impossible – to suppress diverse opinions into one single opinion. The only way to do this is to completely shut down social media, and Cambodia has never done that.

With a growing number of people benefiting from better education, greater exposure abroad, and a youth who considers mastering new technologies “cool,” the new generation of Cambodians is a cautious reader. They don’t believe easily. They may not be as expressive or loquacious as political activists expect, but they are silent and critical observers. They understand what is good and what is bad for Cambodia.

They broke their silence when national territorial integrity was at stake, when the peace that Cambodia had enjoyed uninterruptedly for 26 years was at stake.

The recent peace rally in Phnom Penh and the enthusiasm of Cambodians from all walks of life to donate to frontline soldiers and war evacuees do not seem to suggest government-imposed action. They volunteered to do so. They did so wholeheartedly. Tens of thousands of rally supporters were predominantly from the younger generation, and they mobilized not to continue the war, but to end it.

Cambodia’s unity is consistent, from the highest level, His Majesty the King, to the grassroots people and civilian movements. This unity is based on the desire for Peace.

There is no blockage of access to media like what Thailand is doing. For instance, the Bangkok Post and the Nation have blocked access for Cambodian readers.

Cambodian newspapers like the Khmer Times and the Phnom Penh Post also received massive attacks from Thai netizens but they nevertheless chose to open their outlets for Thai readers so that the latter can balance their reading vis-à-vis the narratives created by the Thai government and military.

2. The thought that “Thailand helped Cambodia in the past and now Cambodians shoot at them”

It is an indisputable fact that Thailand assisted in Cambodia’s peacebuilding in the 1980s and 1990s.

At the special lecture at the ASEAN Secretariat on 5 May 2025, Samdech Techo Hun Sen expressed his gratitude toward ASEAN, including Thailand, for their indispensable contribution to Cambodia’s peace process.

“At this point, I acknowledge that Cambodia owes a great deal to ASEAN. We must never forget that ASEAN played a significant role in Cambodia’s peacebuilding process, although Cambodia was not a member of ASEAN at that time. Consider how vital was the role of Thailand in hosting Cambodian refugees and facilitating the return of nearly 400,000 displaced individuals? Why was His Excellency Chavalit Yongchaiyudh willing to facilitate negotiations between Cambodian different factions both in Thailand and even in Japan? Why was Indonesia willing to provide a negotiation platform for Cambodia? And why was His Excellency Ali Alatas willing to step in and act as a mediator in a conflict far from his own country and without a direct impact on its national security? These actions reflect a shared sense of regional responsibility – an institutional spirit that transcends national interests and borders. It exemplifies the use of soft power, the power of negotiation without resorting to gunfire, and relying instead on multilateralism with engagement from multiple stakeholders.”

Contribution to peace process and refugee repatriation were noble acts by Thai government and people.

But showing gratitude does not mean that Cambodia should cede its land and temples to Thailand.

There is no other word to describe Thailand’s actions than invasion: when Thailand attacked the Preah Vihear temple, which the International Court of Justice determined belonged to Cambodia in two separate rulings in 1962 and 2013; when Thailand extended the battlefield from Preah Vihear and Oddar Meanchey provinces to Pursat province; when Thailand used F-16 and Gripen fighter jets to drop massive bombs like the MK-84 and penetrate deep into Cambodian territory; when Thailand continues to use its unilateral map to claim territory and justify its military actions.

Thailand accused Cambodia of attacking civilians, but bullets cannot distinguish between civilians and military personnel, or between different age groups. Despite having more modern weapons and guidance systems, Thailand has attacked pagodas, schools, hospitals, etc., which are by no means military targets.

3. Troubling signals from Thai media and thinkers

The author has been concerned about the complete absence of calls for peace from the community of Thai media and thinkers. The Cambodian media published opinions daily related to the appeal for peace. Some Cambodians are not writers, but they expressed their worries and concerns for the well-being of the country and its people, and they wrote to advocate for peace.

On the contrary, while it is necessary for the Thai media to justify the country’s actions, it is worrying that Thai journalists and thinkers have not called for peace.

While the Cambodian people have shown enthusiasm for the ceasefire, the possible restoration of peace, and the normalization of borders, the same enthusiasm is not found among the Thai media and thinkers.

Media and thinkers are considered as opinion leaders.

Expressing voices for peace is a noble conduct for humanity, not to serve any political agenda or purposes. It is worrying that Thai media and thinkers are not promoting a peace agenda and that the freedom of expression that Thailand often boasts as superior to Cambodia is not serving the goals of democracy, peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The only conclusion we can draw is that the Thai people and media seem dissatisfied with the peace with Cambodia. But this is not a conclusion we want to draw. We want Thai media and thinkers to prove the opposite.

The author Chan Kunthiny is a Phnom Penh-based geopolitical and security analyst. The views and opinions expressed here are the author’s own.

 

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Opinion: Thailand’s misperception of Cambodia

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