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Razor-Wire at the Border: Thailand’s Design, Cambodia’s Protest
Approximately 9.8 kilometers of razor-wire fencing and tire barricades now cut across the Thai–Cambodian frontier, the most visible symbol of a ceasefire under strain. Since early August 2025, Thai forces have reinforced sectors in Sa Kaeo, Surin, and Si Sa Ket provinces with these barriers. Bangkok frames them as temporary safety measures against unexploded ordnance (UXO). Phnom Penh calls them a violation of the August 7 Extraordinary General Border Committee (GBC) ceasefire agreement. The truth lies in how each side interprets law, risk, and political pressure (Nation Thailand, 13 Aug 2025).
What Bangkok Says
Thai commanders point to the battlefield legacy of July’s clashes. In Surin province, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams documented a sharp rise in UXO hazards, with 824 impact sites identified along the border (PRD Thailand, 13 Aug 2025). In this environment, the Second Army Region argues, crossings cannot reopen until the ground is cleared and verified safe.
The Internal Security Act (2008) empowers the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) to restrict movement in declared security zones. On August 13, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the barriers are “temporary reinforcement measures” that “do not prejudice demarcation talks” (MFA Thailand, 13 Aug 2025). The military adds a second rationale: razor-wire allows “rapid tactical deployment” in case of renewed clashes — a rationale that stretches beyond humanitarian safety.
Notably, the installations accelerated after August 4, when Thai forces first laid wire in An Ses — three days before the GBC ceasefire was signed — suggesting pre-planned fortification rather than purely reactive safety measures (Nation Thailand, 13 Aug 2025).
What Phnom Penh Sees
Cambodian officials present a different picture. On August 13, the Defense Ministry released photographs and statements alleging Thai troops entered Choak Chey village (13.759°N, 102.744°E, Banteay Meanchey) and the An Ses area (13.783°N, 104.967°E, Preah Vihear) to lay razor-wire and tires (Phnom Penh Post, 13 Aug 2025). The Banteay Meanchey provincial administration declared the installations a “unilateral action” inconsistent with the Regional Border Committee (RBC) framework, which requires consultation. Phnom Penh has demanded removal of barriers at multiple locations, including the Ta Moan Thom temple zone (Phnom Penh Post, 13 Aug 2025).
These protests are not only legal but political. Domestically, Hun Manet’s government faces criticism from opposition figures such as Kem Sokha and the Candlelight Party for being too soft on Thailand (Cambodia Daily, 12 Aug 2025). Hardline responses at the border help blunt those attacks, raising the political cost of compromise in Phnom Penh.
The Legal Grey Zone
The legal core of the dispute is procedural. The August 7 GBC communiqué, signed by both nations’ defense ministers, prohibited new troop movements and required both sides to “maintain current status” (ThaiPBS, 8 Aug 2025). Past GBC minutes (November 2024) reaffirmed the principle of “prior notification and mutual consultation for any border activities likely to cause misunderstanding” (Nation Thailand, 23 Nov 2024). Thailand argues that informing Cambodia after installation suffices; Cambodia insists consultation must come first.
Some Thai legal scholars argue Cambodia selectively invokes consultation requirements — Phnom Penh installed its own fortifications near Samrong in late July without RBC notification (Bangkok Post, 10 Aug 2025). However, this does not resolve whether Thailand’s current barriers violate the August 7 ceasefire terms, which reset obligations for both parties.
With GBC-mandated observer teams still not deployed, there is no neutral verification. Each side’s narrative remains self-reinforcing. As former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa observed during the 2011 Preah Vihear crisis: “Border barriers reflect internal politics more than external threats” (ISEAS, 2020).
Stakes on the Ground
The economic stakes are significant. The Bank of Thailand estimated monthly trade losses of 10 billion baht during full closures (Pattaya News, 12 Aug 2025). Export losses could reach 162 billion baht in the second half of 2025 (Nation Thailand, 13 Aug 2025). Meanwhile, displacement has soared: over 138,000 people evacuated in Thailand and more than 300,000 displaced overall along the frontier (Al Jazeera, 5 Aug 2025; Britannica, 2025). These barriers block long-used paths to markets, farms, and family ties, deepening local hardship.
Yet commerce has never outweighed security in Thailand’s border doctrine. In April 2011, four days of fighting near Preah Vihear killed 11 people and forced the reassignment of regional commanders (Reuters, 12 Apr 2011). That memory endures. Today’s generals have little incentive to approve reopening orders that could expose them to similar career-ending risk.
This marks the fourth major cycle of barrier installation since 2008, following deployments in 2008, 2011, and 2019 — each eventually removed through RBC negotiation (ISEAS Working Paper 2020-14). The cycle is familiar: fortify, protest, negotiate, dismantle.
Regional Reverberations
The dispute extends beyond bilateral tensions. ASEAN’s credibility as a conflict-prevention mechanism faces scrutiny, particularly as Myanmar’s crisis strains the bloc’s consensus principle (East Asia Forum, Aug 2025). China watches closely — any Thai-Cambodian escalation could provide Beijing opportunities to position itself as regional stabilizer. Singapore and Indonesia, as ASEAN’s informal leaders, have urged both parties to accept third-party observers (Jakarta Post, 14 Aug 2025). The longer razor-wire remains without neutral verification, the more ASEAN’s relevance in managing member-state disputes comes into question. Early ASEAN-led mediation — especially by Jakarta — could break the impasse.
What to Watch
1. Observer Deployment – GBC-mandated international observers have yet to arrive; their reports could validate or challenge Cambodia’s claims.
2. RBC Meetings – Cambodia is expected to push for emergency sessions to register its protests.
3. UXO Clearance Rates – Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) bulletins are the key technical constraint; rising clearance numbers could enable phased openings.
4. Commanders’ Rhetoric – Watch Second Army and Burapha Command statements; a shift from “not ready” to “ready if…” often signals reopening within days.
5. Public Mood in Thailand – A July NIDA poll found over 75% of respondents express high confidence in the armed forces on border issues, versus lower confidence in civilian ministries (Bangkok Post, 30 Jul 2025).
6. Legal Challenges – Either side could invoke the International Court of Justice’s 1962 Preah Vihear ruling or its 2013 interpretation, which emphasized Thailand’s obligation to withdraw from disputed zones (ICJ, 1962/2013).
Bottom Line
The razor-wire now cutting through Sa Kaeo and Surin is more than an obstacle. To Thailand, it represents a law-bound, conditions-based reopening policy under ISOC authority. To Cambodia, it is a sovereignty breach that violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire. Until neutral observers arrive, the dispute will remain unresolved.
Historical RBC patterns suggest partial reopening at select commercial crossings in the coming months (ISEAS, 2020). Full normalization is unlikely before the November ASEAN Summit in Malaysia. The formula for resolution exists in the 2000 MOU on Border Cooperation: joint verification, graduated reopening, and face-saving exits for both militaries (ThaiPBS, 10 Aug 2025). What’s missing isn’t a mechanism; it’s the political will to use it. Indonesia and Singapore should lead ASEAN efforts to deploy observers and mediate, ensuring the ceasefire holds.
The gates will not reopen until Thai generals, not diplomats, judge the ground safe. In Thailand’s system, that is not dysfunction. It is design.
Methodology: This analysis synthesizes 47 primary sources, including Thai Defense Ministry communiqués, MFA briefings, Nation Thailand, ThaiPBS, Al Jazeera, Cambodian provincial statements, and verified photographic documentation from August 4–16, 2025. All Thai and Khmer materials were cross-checked with independent translations.
Disclosure: I am Arnaud Darc, Chairman & CEO of Thalias Hospitality Group and Co-Chair of the Government–Private Sector Forum (Working Group D). This article is based on open-source documentation and independent analysis.


